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During the 1940s and most of the? 1950s youths; playscl very much a
peripheral role in township politics on the Witwatersrand» The
vast majority of urbanised African youths were absorbed to a
lesser or greater extent into the politically unorganised and
largely enti—social tsotsi subculture. Prganisations such as I.he
Congress Youth League drew its support from .3 numerically
marginal stratum of youth bft&eti in secsPdary •schpol. Youths
associated with the tsotsi gang subculture tevrfed to GIJIJITJ^S
their political and economic frustration through specific fijrms
of subcultiiral style and ritual and througli spontaneous violerw?
directed against symbols of authority and subordination. It was
; only in the very late 1950s that the broader yr.uth constituency
started to become interested in formal political organisation.
' They were particularly drawn to the newly formed F'AC which siiuwed
. to strike an appropriate chord of machismo and avvfci-esSah 1ishment
: aggression. The PAC never recoiled from mobilising the volatile,
violent and.politically undisciplined tsotsi elf-ms-nt. The period
1959—1960 represents an important transitional phase in South
African youth politics, indeed, in anti-apartheid politics movs
generally. In the short period that the F'AC operated legally, it
succeeded in drawing substantial numbers of th» bro'idpr urban
youth constituency into formal political, srijirnisstic-n for the
first time, Although the I960?; witnessed massive state repression,
and apparent po 3 i. t i cr 1 pcquie^cei'te, a -'H'W style of hioiijy
iTti litant, • youth-doTiiri^t^c! opposi t io»-, politics was iricubat iviq in
t h e r fi s i ri i v s p v o:..'t i • io B V'Titit '-'Hue a t i >:-n -^chioc-i;^.. n^sjj/te J("it-
bc;<rivii nc) ciri'J f o r r p d e:;i 1e of !,^u- F'AC, r-1 '.ic.V' corisr; iou'^ii^^^s irj-^o't ocjy
I ' •
i rtst;sivi(=d trp>ner'.d(:"j= pv-o^.t i q. •> in African youth politics.
This paper focuses' specifically on the Uitwatersrand area and,
although I have bits of evidence; to suggest that some; of these
patterns were duplicated in other major South African urban
centres, it would be unwise to assert national generalisat ions
from this CSBR study.
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I
will focus on the tsotsi subculture's lack of interest in formal
politics throughout the 1940s and most of the 1950B.. This will
also involve an investigation of the relationship between the ANC
and the tsotsi youth gangs. In the second section.I look at the
tsotsi." . subculture' s informal forms of political antt cultural
resistance throughout thia period. In the final section I examine
the 'political mobilisation" of urban youth from around 1959,
particularly by the F'AC.
By the late 1930s urban youths were noticeably absent from the
mainstream of African resistance politics. In 1933 H. W. NlKumalo,
writing for the S.a.ntu Wor. .Id, lamented: "Why can't youth organise
themselves to form their own movements? Why can't youth be
represented in the All African ' Convention, ivt the African
National Congress and also in other movements?" Youths,, he
complained) were idle and lazy.(11 Township teenagers, generally
tXriemployed and out of school, were increasingly attrectfjrJ to evi
expanding gang subculture. By the; early— to -mid 19'>0s youths wht.
associated with these nangs, .or youths who identifier) with the1.
style and behaviour of these gangs, were generically called
"tsotsis". Some distinction. however, has to drawn bistween the
hardcore gang element and the broader youth subculture. Every
township had several hardcore cr iminsl israd tsotsi gangs, many of
them heavily armed. The number of youths involved in ttiHKe
violent . gangs was substantial in itself (though virtually
impossible to quantify accurately) but it is safe? to say that tiny
overwhelming majority of city-brpd male African youths were psri:
of the broader subculture. The subculture incorporated the
bigger, organised criminal gangs shading through to small
streetcorner defense and frienship networks who would gamble end1
smoke dagga together. The whole subculture, howRver, shared a
common style code, language and status structure.<H)
In 1944- the Congress Youth League was established.to mf.li i I j. se the
urban African youth constituency and radicalise the OWC frri;n
within. But, although the CYL established a substantial support
base within a number of secondary schools, the organisation never
really identified tsotsis as a potential support base. Tsotsis,
in turn, were not attracted to the CYL.' = rather elitist. styJe of
politics.(3) Throughout the 1940s, then, apart from an ??!empnt of
educated and somewhat older youths drawn to the CYL, township
youths kept their distance from political organisation.
Reflecting this pattern, i>n indignant Bantu World rpsder wrnts in
1946;
' '4
Most of our youth's are addicted to siigomven ant) other
concoctions, and th«? educated amongst them keep company with .
undesirables. Most of our youths know little o>~ nothing of
thi* affairs affecting the race; «t meet ings called for our'
interests, youths are conspicuous by tht*i.r absence.
Another reader expressed similar views in 1950:
One wonders how much influence Corgre=s hss. over African
youths. I have in mired the vast numbers of young , Africans
between eighteen,and thirty years. As far as I can sea, only
the older people take an int'-nrest in African political
organisation. . .
... It is true that W F have the Congress Youth League
today, but does it enjoy the support of the entire youth?
He went on to say that the CYL should try to appeal more to- the
"ordinary youths".<*O | . .
For most of the 1950s tsotsis remained distant.' from political
organisations. Xt was extremely unusual to find people less' than'
twenty years'old attending ANC rallies.<5) It was always "older
people", who attended (nestings at Freedom Square, in iaophiatown.
One ex-t-sotsi informant, Henry Miles, comments: "Only the fathers
and 'the grandfathers used to go to meetings but: none of the
youngsters. They weren't interested."<bt According to another ex-.
tsotsi, Godfrey Mc-loi, politicians seemed very remote, . high ly
educated and respectab]e.(7) The gangs got on with their; own
subcuJturai rituals end inter-gang rivalries. "We 1 weren't
interested in politics; wi? were interested in making love," says
ex-fimerican, "Peggy B«?lair".<3) "Politics in those days,"
observes Peter Magubane, "was not a child1?; game. It was for the
adult's. It was not like today; teane^ers never ventured into
politics." <<?V • • .
Although ANC memt>©vs' teridetJ to urtd.«rst.eir<d the" Boci.o-econorr.ic
context of the tsotsi pher>onw»n<-.tn and hi ail's "ti'its syv?1'em" rather
in an tsotsi individuals, they tj^ iiB1.' -=il '! y fuu'id tsul-si culture
alien and threatening during the l^ HOv-. and 19'j'")'.= . Tdey >"ec.o s ] f?:i
from the violences, irresponsibility and ill—discipline of the
tsotsis.. NeverthelRS1",, there were a number of AMC activists.,
particularly in Sophiatown, whs. made a great effort to
"rehabilitate" individual tsotsis and draw them into con«=.tvuctive.
political activity. Noteworthy here are Robert Pesha, P. Q.
Vundla, Siwiss and Nelson Mandela. According to Don Matters,
"these people really cared". They would try to net the stryi»t
thugs to read about politics and channel their energies into
organisational activity. Although their success w*s limited; a
number of tsotsis did become involved in the local AMC branch.
Mattera himself was such an example. Resha and Mandela wet?
easily accepted by gangsters because they were physically
imposing personalities, Resha had many underworld connections and
Mandela was a skilful boxer . They were not entirely culturally
alien to the tsotsis.. ( 10) It is important to draw a r!i = t iri~t i c«i
between mobilising and rehabilitating- With hardly" an,./
exceptions, only individual youngsters who effectively shed their
tsotsi identity were drawn into AMC structures. The -tEotsis, as a
constituency, were regarded more as a menace to the cripmtjr.i ty
than as a potential support base. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the AHC often supported and participated in local
civil guard movements aimed primarily st wiping cut the t-Botsv
scutjrge. < I. 1 >
II
Although the bulk of township youth had no dealings with
political organisations, it would be incorrect to assume that
they lacked a political consciousness. Their daily.'experience was
packed with hardships and injustice and they certainly had some
sense, however incoherent, of a white oppressor. They experienced
poverty and overcrowding and were well aware of the vast
discrepancies of wealth in the country; there were virtually no
jobs available for city-bred youths and these jobs, that were
available were the most menial avid wJrst paid; schooling' beyond.
the sub-grades was generally unavailable .or too. expensive. The.
most politicising experience of all, however, was pass law
harassment. Throughout the 19^0s, and even more acutely in the
1950s under the Nationalist government, township youths were
constantly threatened hy the prospect of being "endorsed out" of
the cities.
During the 1950s, urban youths became eligible to register and
take out passes at thfj age of sixteen (during the 1940s the
registration age was still eighteen*.. Registration, apart from
being' an infurietingly complicated and often humiliating
bureaucratic procedure, often exposed rattier dodgy urban status.
The? result was that numerous youths chose no* to register even
though* you were considered a. criminal without:. sf "dompas". !1?)
Even'with a pass, a citv-brt=>d youth could b<^  >?virlor 5.;e-d out of two
if he . failed to find employment.. In 1:957, ft Mr Ms tshi.cji of the
Bantu Lads' Hostel remarked at a .meeting of the Johannesburg
Planning Count i. 1 for Non-European .Social. Welfare that there were
• • • • • • . •
"hundreds- of. youngsters who were forced by registration laws to
become fugitive?;." He went on to say that "it is boys such as
these that start gangs'." (ID) Also during 1957, the Golden City
Post ran an expose1" on the Elandsdoorn- and Pilansberg youth
labour camps. The writer explained the precsrioosness of a
township youth's urban status.
.... A boy leaves school with or without his parents' consent
(there is no compulsory schooling) and obtains a work—seek ing
permit which gives him seven.days to find a job.
If he is unsuccessful his permit is renewed for a further
seven days, with a warning that if he does not find work this
time his permit may or will be withdrawn.
Often it is withdrawn, but some are given a further chance-
of one or two weeks.
Once the permit is withdrawn, the hoy cannot look for wort;..
Then the boy, discouraged, stays *wsy from the Pass Office
and roams the streets until he is picked up by the police as
a "vagrant".
Or .he may go back to the Pass Office to try again and gets
"arrested" when his reference.book is examined.
In an earlier extract the writnr comments:
Thus the mere failure by a minor to produce a pass or to show
that he is employed o>- a scholar, becomes proof of delinquent
tendencies.
Such a boy is convicted for vagrancy and. sent to a youth
camp, in many cases without the knowledge of the? parents.(1.4)
Township youths, then, were almost inevitably politicised. ft?
Stan Mot juv-iadi put it:
Township kids shsrpd something in common. From birth... what •
happens to a township kid, what he =ees - pass raids, people
being arrested fc-r pennies, the general expt?>" i ence of the
township kid in the? old townships - politicised him wht?ther
he liked it or not.
So, although the- -j-'erfigt? township youth did not participate in •«
politics. during I lie l?-'+0= and 1 '450=, "he was a smouldering .
volcano. A H he rreeded H P S something' to spark it off. It has
always been like that.'1 (151 •
' • • •
Tsotsi youth found the ANC' s methods of political resistance
incomprehensible but the tsotsi subculture engaged in' its own
. • . '
forms of. cultural and political resistance. I'have shown in a
previous paper how tsc'tei style , ritual and status structures
were' defined in antagonism both to the hegemonic white culture
and to the largely passive, respectful and acquiescent culture of
their 'parents. Apart from its ant i-e>stabl jshment style and.
language, the' tsotsi subculture separated itself off from
mainstream society through its wi11 i.ngness to engage in criminal
activity directed both at whites and township residents, through
its rejection of the work ethic, through the glorification of
violence.(16) Recalling the activities of the Americans, in
St'phiattiwn in the 1940s avid 1950s. Mot juwsdi observed: •
You see, some of them regarded themselves as freedom fighters
- in their own warped way... If he rolls a white business
which BKploits his brother.he thinks he's struck a blow -for
liberation... They thought that to refuse to work for a white
man... they regarded it in itself as a . political,
statement.(17) . . ,
The. Americans of Sophiatown were a great deal more sophisticated
than the average street corner tsotsi- gang. They were probably
the only gang of the time, for instance, which avoided attacking
local residents and it is possible that some of its members had
some coherent ideas about "social banditry". For th's most part,
taotsi cultural resistance was Linsrt icu listed, incoherent,
inconsistent.. It w-5= gut —level and anrjry. The? itaotsi ' s primary
C&nce^n was to survive? on the "stre-Mts
 5 to forge personal power
and. status within his harsh and brutal subculture.
It was the violence inherent in the t.sotsi subcul turp which most
decisively made it irreconcilable with £NC politics. Tsotsis
found ANC passivity baffling, even undignified: the AMC, in turn,
recoiled frcn tsotsi violence and volatility. Tsots'is regarded
police as the universal enemy; they were prepared to.fight with
police physically. Throughout the 1950s in particular there were
numerous incidents of tsotsi-pol ice violence, irau-jUv not related
to a directly political issue. In 1950, for iostance, a riot
broke out in Newel are when police were brought in to deal with
illegal' possession of liquor. "Young hooligans" were reported to
have waged a long battle through the afternoon and night mainly
against police.(18) During thp Sophiatown removals there were a
number of violent engagements between street gang?. and
police. (1.9) In 1953 Mcrcka tsotsis even invaded the local police
i
station to release.a fellow gang member who had been arrested for
sexual assault. The police manning the station only just mawaiqed
to loct themselves in a room and escape out the back way before
the tsotsis smashed down the locked door. The arrested, you.th war-
freed. (RO) Don Matte~a, in a rather over—romanticised • huh
nevertheless revealino way. recalls his impatience as a gangster
during the l^SOs with AMC non-vjolsnce.'
Young people. . - whf?n you saw & cop, you s~tw sri e?nen:y. . . The
politicians had a nice way of anproBchintj things. They looked
for memoranda, they had petitions, they talked to you... Our
memorandum was a knife and a gun.. W E petitioned ourselves in
blood.,
.... As a ti"uci, I coi.il tin't se<5 why the-y were allowing the
police to run ramshod over them, why there M S R no physical'*
.'es :i s I. arir:v/ otrv-rr than the thunth rafis^d iri tht? air. t^"-e khaki
uniforms marching in the streets and sinning their ditties.
.*. I • remember going to my first meeting in Becker Street
CftMC membrars wsr° trying to 'rehabilitate1 Mattera by the
late 1950s!'l , heaving all thfi'se people chatting awsy and
arguing. And I remember thinking: 'When are these people
going to fight? When- «re they going to fight?'(gl)
Yout h s , then, clearly felt a political anger when.they engaged
police who entered the townships to deal with hew brewing, pass
offences and general "unrest" incidents. Youths, for .instance,
were prominent in riots related to these issues in Krugersdorp in
1949 and Newel ere in 1949 and 1950.(32) ' . . •
There is seme scattered evidence to suggest, that the tsotsi
element did' occasionally .participate in AMC campaigns throughout
the 1.950s but, with the possible -except ions of the Sophiatown
removals and the Bantu Education boycott in Bsnoni, gangsters
were never actively recruited to do so.(23) Although AMC methods
were rather baffling to the tsotsis, many of the gangsters
certainly felt .a spontaneous sympathy for some of the. ANC
campaigns.iSA) In an unorganised and undiscipiined way they would
intervene- to further the interests of campaigns as they saw.fit.
In at' least one case, it would appear, gangsters were offered
money by individual. .- activists to help enforce a boycott. (25)
During the Sophiatown removals the interests of gangsters and the
ANC overlapped. Ocasiona!ly gangs would get drawn into campaigns
temporarily through personalised connection?; between gang leaders
and activists.
Even' if they were not actively ami openly rerruited. tsotsis
proved to be extremely useful allies, particularly in boycotts.
.• .They would provide an element of physics!1, coevslon which the ANC,
with its principled rejection of violence in the 1950s, would shy
'' -J O
away, from itself. Thus during tram and bu?, boycott's they would
often prevent passengers from hoarding. <.SP) During the potato ,
boycott, .Matters recalls that his gang would smash the -windows of
fish end chips shops that faiied'to adhere to the boycott.(PS) '<-
Possibly the most effective tsotsi interven t ion ceme in the Bantu'
Education boycott. In 1955 the manager of the Johannesburg HEAD .
reported on an incident in Western Native Township ;n which a
thirteen year old was stabbed by a gang of youths ranging in age •
from nine to fifteen years old. "...The stabbed lp.d refused to
take part in the school boycott; he ws:-r. a good- boy and was thus-
set ' upon by the criminal element."(89). According to Bonner, a
rehabilitated e>i —tsotsi who became a kev activist in the Bei'ioni
branch of the Ccngres1? Youth League used his old ci.-V'ig contacts to
draw tsotsis into the Bantu Education boycott. The Benoni tsofcsis
were extremely effective in preventing . schoolchildren from
attending school .< 30) This appears to be the only clear ex/amp If?
of sustained and orchestrated gang involvement in AMC activity.
Interestingly, the Bantu Education boycott no •; more-'sustained end
successful in Benoni than in all the other urban centres.(31)
[vi Sophiatown the fiercely territorial youth gsnys and the ANC'
found itself united in opposi. t:\c-n to the removals... This was
despite the fsct that the ANC had & history of support for t-hf5
local Civil Puard moVBmfjnt wlio'ss main concern it w-.\s !:r- eradicate
ts-otsi gangster i si. '. 32) The g*>iigs sensed that if their terf were
t-.ikerv a'-.'a-,' from thsm they i-ioiil-1 he powerless and, ul. t i'n.v*tr?l y, '«
disintegrate.. Throughout ths 1930;.- . particularly in the late
1950=, g?.iV5«ters H B V S ipvolved in onooing street hattles with
police and refiiovsl .'teems;. '.33) Although the ANC understood the
-,• importance of ttu; youth gang constituency in its struggle against,
the removals. the organisation had its work cut cut to restrain
-, youths from armed resistance, Tn 1953, when the Sophiatown
removals had become a very real prospect, a revealing lead story
appeared in the Bantu World. The largo headline read '."MACHINE
GUNS,:. RIFLES, REVOLVERS HIDDEN IN SOPHIATOWM" with the sub-head
"The People Follow the Congress Lead in Non—Violence".'
Minister Swart was right. There is an arsenal of machine-
guns,, rifles end revolvers in the Western Areas.' There ere
people who are prepared to use them but the African National.
Congress will have nothing to do with them. . .
For the past couple of weeks,- Sophiatown has been a
battleground for the souls of the youth. . . .-' . . • . .
The violent section have detnand£?d action. •••••'.•'.
But Congress has fought for non-violence and the pteople have
followed its lead.
• The battle Wijs fought again over the weekend. :
' Young men poured into Sop'hiatown from all over the Reef.
They gathered ivy secret in many rooms. The 'wordy battle
r:aqed for hours, '
They demanded violent action to-check the Removal.
Congress people pleaded with them to stick to the non-.
violent 1ine. . . .
' Meanwhile big forces of'police? patrolled the streets,., the
.railway stations of the Western Areas, the bus stops end the
•street corners. . .
The weekend passed without violence.(34)
Although the ANC and the tso.tsis often worked together to
mobilise against the removals, cultural anjrl strategic tensions
ran deep. Throughout the 1950s tt>(; ANC leadership, with « few
exceptions, fai. led to tune in to th;> wavelength of the massive
vout-h gany constituency. The ANC was rf»srl<i'bly patient...
disciplined, non-violent, intellectual, avid, for the most part, it
had tremendous r^siiact for Western disnocrc t :i •:: value;;. The youth
••"•'gangs- were impatient, undiscipl .ln>3d -Mid angry.. Although th-vy WPI"P
deeply influenced by American media.images, they were utterly
scornful of white westernised values. They were politicised but
indifferent to political practise. . The? ANC remained an
organisation' "for older people".
III
[ Powerfully influenced by the- "Af r icanist" idea's of Anton Lfimbedr;
• * ' ' . • '
) and A. P. Mds, the ANC Youth League was established iv. I'? 4 4 with
r the specific aim of radicalising the ANC from .within. The CYL
•• effectively seised control of the ANC. at th« annual conference of
i the organisation in Bloemfontein in 1.94'?» The CYL' rs Progr aimne of
j . • Action was . officially adopted. By the early 19"5Os the CVL
I . •
; leadership had moved into the leadership position", of the ANC, .
! Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, amongst others, rose to
; prominence at this time. Although a cert-sin orgavu <=ati or.al
| dynamism was injected into the ANC, many of the principles of thi;
original CYL were ever turned, particularly the rejection of
alliances with sympathetic whites, coloured5*, Indians and
Communistrs.' Oticp the CYL had achieved it?.- r-hjectiv" of
radicalising the ANC to an extent and the lesdrership structures
had shifted,, the oriyintil CY(.. ;.ost direction. Its policies bFr-c^ 'Cf?
indistinrjuishahie from t!-ose of the parent bodv and it simply
becfsrns the wine of the ANC which concentrated on refj.-uit i ng
younger people. Put n s i rimer i ng tension gradusllv eniergi«rl within
the CYL between those who were* loyal to the parent body and those
1 T
who saw themselves as loyal to the original principles of the
CYL.-A faction within the CYL, based largely in the Orlando East
branch under the leadership of PotU-.ko Leballo, felt that the ANC
was out of touch with the youth constituency. The CYL, this
faction felt, had to continue its task of radicalising the AIMC
from within. On the one hand. it argued that thn? ANC should not
cooperate with non-Africans and all government —1 inked "puppet
institutions" such as Advisory Boards. On. the other hand, it
advocated a more assertive mobilisation of the volatile youth
constituency. Leballo was expelled from the ANC and the . Orlando
East branch wa=; suspended. Leballo and hi.s followers were
considered to be? irresponsible avid racially e'xc lusi vist. Many
Youth Leaguers rallied around the charismatic Leballo and a major
breakaway, which lead to the emergence of the .P6C, was
precipitated. In April 1959 the PAC was officially inaugurated
under the leadership of Robert Sobukws, a highly intellectual and
charismatic follower of the old I.embede school. Sobukwe had made
a tremendous impact in the couple of years he had spent on the
Wi twatersrarsd since his move from Standerton.(35)
By August 1957, only three months after its inauguration, the FAC
claimed a sighed up membership of almost 25 000 of which roughly
half' came from the Transvaal . (36) The PA" was esssiit ial'ly an
organisation fo>- young men. (Bail Gcr'-h^ rt prnphariipes this point. •
This • observation was supported by number my
... It must be ncl ed that., without doubt, M P and, not
was the most di st i nijuish i vvj chsrsctsristic of the PAC's
followi.no. At every level, of organisation, frj-.im the; n?.ti ovvnl
leadership dc.wn to the least fjgimsnted non—':. srd-rsrry i ™.i.
supporter, tile people asnoc iatp'Ji with the F'v--C we'1? rit lis^st a
. decade younger on average th?n ihr-se in th^ A N C The PtiC, it
was sometimes said, needed no youth lsfgus because it w"<=,
itself an organisation of youth frnm top to bottom.':??)
informants. "People who joined the PAC were mostly young,
guys"(38); "The PAC was made up predominantly of young people? -
they signed up many youths"(39); "The young people were the,
PACs'.'C^O). Gerhart goes on to assert that it was the tsotsi
element which was particularly attracted to the PAC.
If any single group could be described s-3 distinctively PAC
in orientation, it would b>? the broad category of Africans
known in some "contexts ;.vs "location bo/s" and in ..others as1
tsotsi,s. ... Usually more educated than lower class workers,,
yet unable to break into the ranks of the pr»tty hour geoi-si p,
they are scornful of the low status and low paid employment
available? to them,' and engage in rackets, con games and
thefts of every description. Those who are unemployed 'ray
group into gangs of juvenile delinquents... and participate
in crimes of violence-- ... They are . "embittarecf, frustrated,
aggressive, non-conformist, suggestible, and prone to
violence," CKuperU notes, and "they rrajpet the poliv,hs<d
behaviour of the educated elite," the so-called "e::cu?e ms"
. type of older educated urban African. With little to lor.e
materially and much to gain from the removal of job and wage
discrimination, they are a politically volatile slpmeot and
one which was drawn strongly to the PAC.(41)
The PAC immediately struck the right chord- with th» fcsotsi youth.
Tsotsis were particularly attracted to tlr? PAC's emphasis on
"action" and confrontation. Although the organisation officially
distanced itself from violence there was an unstated adrni'.at ion
for violent: resistance. According to Gerhart "there seemed to be
an assumption that violence was inevitable, or even desirable,-
Unlike the ANC., for i-.'h.ich non-vio lence; was a recognised policy,
the PAC pointedly left its option"? open regarding intithorls of
strugg! e. " (<-\S) Tiv;? f'AC: rhetoric >ns'."!«? more ?:enc.<? to the
arjqfe'B'r.ivG'l y si1;' :i -•(=?• >f\h 1 i=litent v.'/otsi subculture. A.I though*
tsf'tsis did riot f:&'.p=F,sri]v identify with the intellectual
concept of Afr i ceni s-.r-, tliey j dsntif ied with the PAC scorn for
Africans who immita ted thf? White middle class. The PAC ."shared
, the sate sense of urgency and frustration, the sartf? explosive
anger as the younger generation,"!'!-.3)
» •
Whereas the AMC acted within a scrupulously legal and reeptectabIs
framework, this PAC were not averse to breaking the law and
offending the white liberal establishment. Short of finances, the
.PAC would quietly encourage tsotsis to steal equipment for
producing leaflets- or steal a car to f i;ir thpr organisational
objectives.(44) ' This made sense to tcotsis.
The PAC . also tapped into a powerful machismo strain within ths
tsotsi; subculture.' Young women were horrifically objectified and
abused and systematically, pushed to the? periphery' of the
subculture. (45) The PAC. did not see a role- for women in
political resistance?. Its membership was almost exclusively male;
it considered a woman's league unnecessary.(4&) This ' duplicated
. . the ' pattern of urban youth gang membership and, once again, it
made-sisnse to tsotsis. .
during. 1959 and 1.960 this PAC recruited actively not only amongst
school children but also amongst street giings. This pattern of
recruitment had already started to pmsrge around 1957 and 1953 in
Orlando'. Marginalised Africanists in the Orl=ndo branch of the
.CVl., who would let=r become PAC members, wore having an impact
amongst tsotsis in Orlando prior to the formation of th.? PftC. "'wo
of my informants rsrall the work r-f an ertivist by tUe neme of
1
 IBfen. Mapisa, a boning trainer who worl^ e.-d out at s gymnp.<=•iuis in
Or lando. '. 47) He was a strong man who carr iod a gun around with
him. He was respected by the tsotsis of Orlando. Hs was a
"capoble and intelligent" man who attempted to po i i t ic i«;^  bhe
gangs. Initially a member of the? Orlando CV'L, he* bBcsms "a scout"
•for the FAC. Mapisa apparently recruited young 'nsri at his
gymnasium. "While people were practising boxing, the/ would be?
holding a caucus" . (<+8) Mspisa would also call gangs together" and
speak to them; he would try to redirect their energy triward's
politics. He would- tell them to identify the white establishment-
as the enemy rather then ether gangs. He w.ss apparently
particularly successful in recruiting members of the Otto Town,
arid Boom Town gangs. ('+9)
Robert Sobukwe was himself an extraordinarily powerful
personality. He was charismatic,- "dyna<riic" and influential,
particularly in Or 1 encio . (50) Like Mspisa, his personal inf Uienc?
was established amongst the township youth prior to the
establishment of the PAC, while still 3 member of the ANC.C5.li
Norris Nkosi, an Orlando tsotsi. during the 1950s. 'recall1-, the
huge impact of Bobukwe- omongBt the youth during 19?9 and i960.
Sobukwe used to address numerous meetings ond young sisn would
•flock to listen to him speak. Although scholars were prcb-='bly th"
biggest constituency of the FAC. the organisation clearly drew in
t=>otni youth on a l^rg?1 scale.. PAC activists went "scouting on
the weekends" . They would tell nangsters: "Stop n>o les ting ptpoplt;
avid come ?nd listen to thif- gofipi-'l . " •'SH) "In the little time X. the
PAC 3 had." ob':"rvi?d Stan v'.o '•: ji.'w;icJi „ "it war; ohsr.r'nei'ml how thr> 4
youth r e>Bpoi"!df''s1 to Bobiikwe'-' s call ."(T33)
As parly as 1950, it seems clesr that the Eout'i African state
feared the potential politicisation tf the tsotsi constituency.
The state racogwised tsotsi gangs as1 a m^jcr social control
issue and started to postulate about the devastating consequences
should this violent and vo3 stile constituency becorce
pol :i t i':is(?d . < 54 ) In a recent; paper, Jon Hyslop suggests that the
Bantu Education system was set up largely as a solution to the
problems of social control of the urban youth. Not only did the
state want to curb the massive crime lc-vels in the townships but
it also feared the potential political mobilisation of the lumpen
youth..(55) The urban youth, particularly the tsotsi element, .
appeared, to be the prima'-y target of the p'ost-Sharpevi 1 le State
of fmertjency. ' In April i960 the.Golden Ci_tv Post reported the.
fo1 lowing: .
Systematically and with massive forces of he&viiy—armed men',1,
thp police have raided their "way through most of the densely-
populated African areas in South Africa during the past week.
They arc? not raiding for 'passes', the deputy .commissioner
of Police for the Wi twetersvend, Colonel J.C. Lsinmer,. . told
POST — they are trying to clean up "out-of-works, criminals
and loafers."
"Out-of-works, criminals avid .loafers" were almost invariably
synononiDus with tsotsis in administrative jargon. In July 1960
the . Golden Citv Post ran a series of articles about thousands of
youths being afested on the Witwater Brand. On July 17 it was
reported that about 15 000 youths were being held in the ' giant
Modder B jail, a converted disu=ed mine compound which the
government pu>-chas=d from ERPM in December 1--59. Youths werH
arriving from throughout the Fvsef, from aa far afield 3=
Pretoria, Krugersdorp, Springs and Nin?*. . Every d*>y- li: wss
".reported, about 100 youths were >-«1easi?d aftr-.-'- h=wir.ci !:n=«n
thoroughly screened while about the same numbev were toei.nq taker,
in every day. Meny of the? "released" wpre sent to farm jails or''
returned to the reserves where they, or their parents, were born.
Youths were generally detained under Section h of the-? f-oiscqency *
Regulations. Some of them had spent up to two months in Modder B
without being charged. (S7) A Efij?t writer described the aoirv:;;s-oyi
at Modder B vividly.
• Seven or eight truck loads of prisoners thunder in and cut
every day -- some of them being brought in for detention or
"screening" by a special enquiry inside the jail, presided
• over by three magistrates, some of the prisoners b-sinrj fcal-ipp.
away for release or to join the labour gangs on the farms.
It was reported that a very large proportion of the approximately
l't 000 • Modder B detainees were under the: age? of St. Coivmon
criminals and pass offenders were apparently separated from the?
political detainees.(58) It seems d a a r that this massive
clsmpdown on township youth, although not always, directed at
pc-ropls who were overtly political, ws=. closely liviked to the
political . control objectives of the State of Fmerqenry. The
timing of this clampdown could al^o suyue;t. that the state
perceived the extent to which the. PAC had penetrated the wirier
youth cons t i tuency .
In late March and April of 19-50 a new wave . of tsotsi gang
violence <=wept throufjh the townships. ('lave^  of tsotsi violer:ce
were common to the towrfehips but, for th."? first timBj a political
dimension crept i.n'"o t.'=i>'T. i. set ivi ty . ' T>9 ) Diirinc; the chaotic
parly day? of the? rltatis of Emc-rtjency the- tf.otsi '5 uriminsl and
political activities? wc-rt? intertwined and ambiguci'-is. O P 3 April
thf? go.lrjen City; Post, undfi-r thp f rontp-sgp h.--pd)ine "BOY THUGB
TAKE DV-'ER from political leader1; in trm Townships". ran the
»fDllowing story: .
Vicious young thugs cashing in on the crisis have? virtually
taken over the townships in the-past fen days.
r Ivi savage outbursts of violence they have in the past week
been responsible for hundreds of asssi.il ts, at least one
murder of an African cop, and scores of rapes.
.... Taking advantage . of the confusion arising out of the
crisis, and the? fact that many houses have been left
unprotected, they have used Pen Africanist and A .N .C,. . s.loqans
33 •"fronts' for their activities 35 they continue to rob .-and
pillage on the majority of the Reef'5 larger towns. . .
... Although usually wel1—behaved, the high school hoys from
an Orlando school were involved in various .sto.nings' and
• attacks. ' _ .• .
They later told POST that' that they had been joined by the
now notorious Beriini; and Apaches of Orlando East. .
Apparently on the stay—away day these gangs forgot that they
we'-e enemies in a common purpose of 'assaulting' innocent
p e o p l e . • . • ' • . ' "• •"'• . • ' ; :
POST learned that most of the thugs responsi-b 1 e for. this,
terror -are loafers who do not possess reference books... (60)
According to the article, the.offic.es of the Peri—Urban. Health
Board in Alexandra were attacked by a gang of tsotsis called the
Red Knife Boys. They attempted to burn the building down. The
Peri-Urban Health Board was not only a symbol of state authority
but an institution which dedicated itself to wiping out the
isotsi menace in Alexandra. A crack police unit operated under
its authority which the tsotsis celled the "Peri—Urbans"-
Wha't emerged in the wnkci of PftC mobilisation, Sharpevi1le and the
declaration of thv? State Of frnxr-rgt-iicy was. the first foreshadowing
of today's so—:a!J vd "V om-tstftsis" . Thr.i.i = -i nds of tsots-is had been
politically mobilised and gave th<=:ir al l=?g i S U C K to a political
organisation. But they wi?<-e estrEifo'y diffirult to control. Hon-
yiTSlence, account ?b i 1 iky arid ci!cr:l ' wtetl political action i-i^'i o
•alien concepts to thR tsotsi. si'bcul tcir «>. The: situation gob
'•?;<••-:?<.,':'•!• ••.--.:-"•
completely out of hand during the State of EroHmjency nhon
nunierous leaders who Here respected avid admired by the tsotsi
cadres were detained. All hope of placing these angry arid
brutalised street gangs under some' kind of political discipline
and accountability fell away. The gangs saw no contradict ion
between their usual criminal activities and their new politics]
motivations. Even the PAC, who had recruited these youths so
enthusiastically, were forced to condemn the post—Sharp^vi1 Is-
activities of the tsotsis. A PAC sipotesmsn, William Jalohe,
stated: "We strongly condemn the .fact that these' irresponsible
youths are using violence on innocent people."fM>
The PAC and, to a lesser patent, the ANC once it had adopter! t he-
armed struggle, retained their large support base emonqst the
urban youth after the organisations were .banned. Once the
organisations went underground end dozens of members were given
long jail sentences, organisational coherence disintegrated
altogether but interest in Pogo arid Mkorjto we Sj..zw£ re-mained high
amongst the urban youth. (6c?) Throughout the 1960s, s step!"*"
trickle of youths made the decision to leav= the ceunt-fv and join
the exile movements. '.63) According t.o Matters, ex-gangstrrs
joined the- exiled ANC in.Jargp number= during the 1 ^ 60s;. ' Twenty
to thirty members of his old Vultures gang., he claims, h<?c&tTt(?
active member'? of th«=? AM'", i nc 1 udiriG Geofqe> Hut ton, Hosi Tc?.ile and
Bernard '^rim=tne. Tin? jr-Fli;-s of ex—gangsters ivito the AMC; „ he P.tfdr,.
i nfluenr.sd t'v.» f'iNC fvom within and i»oved the orgapi = st inn in a
mof 'P- vjolc-nt and mi. I i t •?. "i t. direction. They reinforced the policy
of firmed BITuricil<?.. "Thi»- violent srpna was not n»"j to the
gangster. He ccultl kill now for .a more- worthwhile cauae.
Of course, th.os-2 that joined the exile movements represented a
tiny fraction of the urban youth. For the bulk of urban youth in
the • 1960s the key political and social terrein shifted from the
streets to thp Bantu Education schools. Bantu E:duce>t j on .involved
a dramatic. lowering of educational standards but it also
0
dv sirist j cal ly increased the availability of schooling for
Africans. Hyslop shows that Bantu Education played a major role
in bringing about the political quiescence of the 1960s, despite
simmering qrievances against the system., (65) Nevertheless, • the
new education systeiv started to forge a view unity, a common set
of experiences and grievances amongst the township youth. Mass:
schooling helped to weld together the fractured and internally
antagonistic youth constituency.1 Although the 1960s was
essentially a quiescent decade, then, the groundwork was being
established for .the eruption of 1976.. The youth constituency was
starting to cohere and loose political allegiances and
i d F! u 1 o g i e s .. p a rtic u 1 a r 1 y b 1 a c k r. o nsciousness, had t a k e n r o o t.
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